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Abstract
We add epistemic modal operators to the language
of here-and-there logic and define epistemic here-
and-there models. We then successively define
epistemic equilibrium models and autoepistemic
equilibrium models. The former are obtained from
here-and-there models by the standard minimisa-
tion of truth of Pearce’s equilibrium logic; they pro-
vide an epistemic extension of that logic. The latter
are obtained from the former by maximising the set
of epistemic possibilities; they provide a new se-
mantics for Gelfond’s epistemic specifications. For
both definitions we characterise strong equivalence
by means of logical equivalence in epistemic here-
and-there logic.
1 Introduction
Gelfond extended disjunctive answer set programs by epis-
temic operators in order to quantify over answer sets [Gel-
fond, 1991; 1994; Baral and Gelfond, 1994]. He called pro-
grams with epistemic operators in rule bodies epistemic spec-
ifications. They allow to reason about incomplete informa-
tion, understood as situations where there are multiple answer
sets. The semantics of epistemic specifications is in terms of
world views, which are maximal collections of answer sets.
Similar to answer set semantics, a world view S of an epis-
temic specification Π is defined by means of the reduct ΠS
of Π by S. The construction is in two steps: first, compute
the reduct ΠS, eliminating the modal operators; second, com-
pute the maximal collection of answer sets of ΠS and check
whether it equals S.
Subsequently various different semantics were proposed
for epistemic specifications [Chen, 1997; Wang and Zhang,
2005; Truszczyn´ski, 2011; Gelfond, 2011; Kahl, 2014].
Some propose other definitions of reducts, while others pro-
pose semantics inspired by the Kripke semantics of modal
logics. We here introduce a new semantics that is based on
an epistemic extension of Pearce’s equilibrium logic [1996;
∗We thank Pedro Cabalar, Michael Gelfond, Patrick Thor Kahl
and David Pearce for useful discussions and feedback. Our work
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2006]. This had been undertaken by Wang and Zhang [2005],
however for the somewhat outdated version of epistemic
specifications of [Gelfond, 1991; 1994]. Our version is closer
to Gelfond’s [2011] and Kahl’s [2014] more recent versions.
Pearce’s equilibrium logic allows to characterise answer
set semantics of non-epistemic logic programs. The underly-
ing here-and-there logic (HT) characterises their strong equiv-
alence [Lifschitz et al., 2001]. We here add two epistemic op-
erators K and Kˆ to the language of HT and define epistemic
HT models (EHT models). We then define epistemic equi-
librium models by generalising the usual minimality criterion
over HT models to EHT models. We finally define autoepis-
temic equilibrium models (AEEMs) as epistemic equilibrium
models that are maximal both under set inclusion and under
a preference ordering on epistemic equilibrium models. The
latter provide a new logical semantics for epistemic specifica-
tions and more generally for nested epistemic logic programs.
We establish a strong equivalence result and compare our se-
mantics with existing approaches. We demonstrate by means
of examples that all other semantics differ from our approach
and that Kahl’s comes closest.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 re-
calls epistemic specifications. Section 3 introduces the logic
EHT. Section 4 defines epistemic equilibrium models (EEM)
and autoepistemic equilibrium models (AEEM). Section 5
compares the latter with existing semantics of epistemic spec-
ifications, in particular with Kahl’s. Section 6 provides strong
equivalence characterisations in terms of EHT equivalence
for both kinds of models. Section 7 concludes.
2 Epistemic specifications
Several versions of epistemic specifications were introduced
by Gelfond [1991; 2011]. Kahl [2014] recently proposed a
further improvement that we recall here.
2.1 The language of epistemic specifications
The language of epistemic specifications extends that of dis-
junctive logic programming by the modal operator K . The
formula Kϕ is read “ϕ is known to be true”.1 Literals of this
language are of three different kinds: objective literals (l),
1The original presentation also has a modal operator M that is
dual to K : instead of K not l it has notM l and instead of notK not l
it has M l. Due to this definability via K we do without M here.
literal L if S |= L if S 6|= L
K λ replace by λ replace by ⊥
notK λ replace by ⊤ replace by not λ
Table 1: Kahl’s definition of reduct.
extended objective literals (λ) and extended subjective liter-
als (L). They are defined by the following grammar:
lF p | ∼p
λF l | not l
LF K λ | notK λ
where p ranges over the set of propositional variables P. So
the language has two negations: strong negation ∼ and default
negation not , where notϕ is read “ϕ is false by default”.2
A rule ρ is of the form
l1 or . . . or lm ← G1 , . . . , Gn
where the literals of the head l1 or . . . or lm are objective lit-
erals and the literals of the body G1, . . . , Gn are extended
literals (either extended objective literals or extended subjec-
tive literals). We suppose that the head of ρ is ⊥ if m = 0 and
that the body of ρ is ⊤ if n = 0.
An epistemic specification is a finite collection of rules.
Here is Gelfond’s [1991] ‘eligibility’ example that was taken
up in almost all papers on epistemic specifications:
h or f ←
e ← h
e ← f ,m
∼e ← ∼h,∼ f
i ← notK e, notK∼e
where h stands for ‘high GPA’, f stands for ‘fair GPA’, e
stands for ‘eligible for scholarship’ and i stands for ‘to be
interviewed’. Let us call that epistemic specification ΠG.
2.2 The semantics of epistemic specifications
Let S be a consistent set of objective literals, i.e., a set of
objective literals such that there is no p ∈ P with both p ∈ S
and ∼p ∈ S . Satisfaction of extended objective literals in S is
defined by:
S |=ES l if l ∈ S ;
S |=ES not l if l < S .
Let S be a non-empty collection of such consistent S ’s. Sat-
isfaction of extended subjective literals in S is defined by:
S |=ES K λ if S |=ES λ for every S ∈ S;
S |=ES notK λ if S 6|=ES K λ.
For example,
{
{p}
}
|=ES notK not p because
{
{p}
}
6|=ES
K not p.
Let Π be an epistemic specification and let S be a non-
empty collection of consistent sets of objective literals.
Whether S is a world view of Π is decided by computing the
2Gelfond’s original language is slightly different, with ∼K l in-
stead of notK l, etc. They however have the same semantics, mu-
tatis mutandis.
formula world views{
p ← K p
} {
∅
}
{
p ← notK not p
} {
{p}
}
{
p or q ← , p ← notK not q
} {
{p}
}
{
p or q ← , r ← K p
} {
{p}, {q}
}
Table 2: Examples of epistemic specifications and their world
views.
reduct of Π and then checking a fixed-point equation. The
reduct ρS of a rule ρ ∈ Π with respect to S is obtained from
ρ by eliminating the K operator according to Table 1. The
reduct of Π with respect to S, noted ΠS, is then defined as
ΠS = {ρS : ρ ∈ Π}.
Finally, S is a world view ofΠ if it equals the set of all answer
sets of ΠS. As the case notK not l may introduce double
negation not not l, the computation of such answer sets has
to resort to answer-set programming with nested expressions
[Lifschitz et al., 1999].
For example, the only world view of Gelfond’s ‘eligibility’
specificationΠG of Section 2.1 is
{
{h, e, i}, { f , i}
}
. Table 2 con-
tains more examples. The reduct of
{
p←K p
}
by
{
∅
}
is p←⊥
and its reduct by
{
{p}
}
is p←p. Both have exactly one answer
set:
{
∅
}
. Only the former matches its reduct, so the unique
world view is
{
∅
}
. The reduct of
{
p or q ←, p ← notK not q
}
by
{
{p}
}
is
{
p or q ←, p ← not not q
}
and its reduct by
{
{q}
}
is
{
p or q ←, p ← ⊤
}
. Both have exactly one answer set: {p};
therefore the former
{
{p}
}
is the unique world view.3
Observe that whenΠ does not contain K then it has at most
one world view: the collection of all answer sets of Π.
3 Epistemic here-and-there logic EHT
The logic of here-and-there HT is a monotonic three-valued
logic that is intermediate between classical logic and intu-
itionistic logic. An HT model is an ordered pair (H,T ) of val-
uations (sets of propositional variables) satisfying the hered-
ity constraint H ⊆ T . In this section we introduce epistemic
HT logic (EHT), which extends HT by two epistemic modal
operators K and Kˆ in the spirit of intuitionistic modal logics
[Fischer-Servi, 1976; Farin˜as del Cerro and Raggio, 1983;
Simpson, 1994; Bierman and de Paiva, 2000]. Its epistemic
HT models (EHT models) are collections of HT models. From
the perspective of modal logic, an EHT model can be viewed
as a refinement of S5 models (which are sets of valuations)
where valuations are replaced by HT models.
3.1 The language of EHT
The language of EHT is given by the following grammar:
ϕF p | ⊥ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | Kϕ | Kˆϕ
where p ranges over the set of propositional variables P. An
EHT theory is a finite set of EHT formulas, noted Φ, Ψ, . . .
3 Gelfond’s [2011] approach differs for the case notK λ: when
S 6|= notK λ then it is replaced by ⊥. As a result of this subtle
difference, Gelfond gets the world views
{
∅
}
and
{
{p}
}
for the 2nd
example, and no world view at all for the 3rd. As Kahl argues, both
are not as intuitive as his results.
The set of propositional variables occurring in a formula ϕ
is noted Pϕ. For example, PK (p→q) = {p, q}. This generalises to
EHT theories: PΦ =
⋃
ϕ∈Φ Pϕ.
As usual, ⊤, ¬ϕ and ϕ↔ ψ respectively abbreviate ⊥→⊥,
ϕ→⊥ and (ϕ→ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). A formula is said to be non-
modal if it does not contain the modal operators K and Kˆ .
3.2 EHT models
An EHT model is an ordered pair
(
T , ~
)
in which
• T ⊆ 2P is a nonempty set of valuations;
• ~ : T → 2P is a map such that ~(T ) ⊆ T for every T ∈ T .
When T = {T } is a singleton then the EHT model
(
T , ~
)
can be identified with the HT model (~(T ),T ).
The inclusion constraint on ~ generalises the heredity con-
straint of HT logic to EHT. We say that
(
T , ~
)
is total on
S ⊆ T if ~(T ) = T for every T ∈ S. When
(
T , ~
)
is total on
T then ~ is the identity function id. We identify
(
T , id
)
with
the classical S5 model T .
A pointed EHT model is a pair
((
T , ~
)
,T0
)
where
(
T , ~
)
is
an EHT model and T0 ∈ T , the latter being the actual world.
A multipointed EHT model is a pair
((
T , ~
)
,T0
)
where
(
T , ~
)
is an EHT model and T0 ⊆ T .
3.3 EHT truth conditions
We now define the satisfaction relation for EHT formulas.
Those for ⊥, ∧ and ∨ are standard.
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT p if p ∈ ~(T )(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT ϕ→ψ if
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT ϕ⇒
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT ψ and(
T , id
)
,T |=EHT ϕ⇒
(
T , id
)
,T |=EHT ψ(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT Kϕ if
(
T , ~
)
,T ′ |=EHT ϕ for every T
′ ∈ T(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT Kˆϕ if
(
T , ~
)
,T ′ |=EHT ϕ for some T
′ ∈ T
It follows that for negation we have(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT ¬ϕ iff
(
T , ~
)
,T 6|=EHT ϕ and
(
T , id
)
,T 6|=EHT ϕ.
This can be simplified further, see Proposition 3.5.1 below.
For example,
(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT p∨¬p iff p ∈ ~(T0) or p < T0.
Raising the bar of our examples,(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT K (p∨¬p) → Kˆ¬¬p
iff p ∈ T for some T ∈ T .
When for an EHT model
(
T , ~
)
and a set of designated
worlds T0 ⊆ T we have
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT ϕ for every T ∈
T0 then we write
(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT ϕ for short. We call((
T , ~
)
,T0
)
a multipointed EHT model of ϕ. Finally, we write(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT Φ when
(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT ϕ for every ϕ ∈ Φ.
Proposition 3.1. The following are equivalent.
•
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT Φ;
•
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT K (
∧
Φ) for every T ∈ T ;
•
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT K (
∧
Φ) for some T ∈ T .
An EHT model
(
T , ~
)
can alternatively be described as
a collection
{
(~(T ),T )
}
T∈T of HT models. We display
concrete pointed and multipointed models as collections{
(~(T ),T )
}
T∈T where the actual worlds are underlined. Here
are some examples:{
(∅, {p}), (∅, {q})
}
|=EHT ¬p
{
(∅, ∅)
}
|=EHT ¬K¬p → p{
(∅, {p}), (∅, {q})
}
|=EHT ¬¬p
{
({p}, {p})
}
|=EHT ¬K¬p → p{
(∅, {p}), (∅, {q})
}
|=EHT ¬K¬p
{
(∅, {p})
}
6|=EHT ¬K¬p → p
Observe that the satisfaction of formulas of the form Kϕ,
¬Kϕ, ¬¬Kϕ, Kˆϕ, ¬Kˆϕ and ¬¬Kˆϕ does not depend on the
designated worlds: when
(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT Kϕ for some T0 ⊆
T then
(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT Kϕ for every T0 ⊆ T , etc.
The next result is the heredity property in EHT: if a for-
mula has an EHT model then it also has a classical S5 model.
Proposition 3.2. If
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT ϕ then
(
T , id
)
,T |=EHT ϕ.
We now list some useful properties.
Proposition 3.3. Let ϕ be an EHT formula. Then:
1.
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT¬ϕ iff
(
T , id
)
,T 6|=EHTϕ;
2.
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT¬¬ϕ iff
(
T , id
)
,T |=EHTϕ;
3.
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT¬Kϕ iff
(
T , id
)
,T ′ 6|=EHTϕ for some T
′ ∈ T ;
4.
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT¬Kˆϕ iff
(
T , id
)
,T ′ 6|=EHTϕ for every T
′ ∈ T .
We end with an appropriate definition of bisimilarity. Let(
T1, ~1
)
and
(
T2, ~2
)
be two EHT models and P ⊆ P. A rela-
tion Z ⊆ T1 × T2 is called a P-bisimulation if
1. both Z and Z−1 are serial4, and
2. if T1ZT2 then T1∩P = T2∩P and ~1(T1)∩P = ~2(T2)∩P.
If there exists a P-bisimulation Z between
(
T1, ~1
)
and(
T2, ~2
)
such that T1ZT2 then T1 and T2 are called P-
bisimilar.
Proposition 3.4. Let ϕ be an EHT formula. Let
((
T1, ~1
)
,T1
)
and
((
T2, ~2
)
,T2
)
be two pointed EHT models such that T1
and T2 are Pϕ-bisimilar. Then
(
T1, ~1
)
,T1 |=EHT ϕ iff
(
T2, ~2
)
,T2 |=EHT ϕ.
3.4 EHT validity
A formula ϕ is called EHT valid if
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT ϕ for every
EHT model
(
T , ~
)
.
All principles of intuitionistic modal logics that were stud-
ied in the literature [Simpson, 1994] are EHT valid. As al-
ways in intuitionistic modal logics, K and Kˆ are not dual:
while Kˆϕ → ¬K¬ϕ is valid, the other direction is not. Here
are some more examples: Kϕ → ¬Kˆ¬ϕ, ¬Kˆ¬ϕ → ¬¬Kˆϕ
and ¬¬Kϕ → ¬K¬ϕ are all valid while their converses
are not. On the other hand, none of ¬¬Kϕ → Kϕ and
K¬¬ϕ → Kϕ is EHT valid. The same holds if we replace
K by Kˆ . (The EHT model
{(
∅, {p}
)}
provides a countermodel
for all examples above.) However:
Proposition 3.5. The equivalences ¬Kϕ ↔ Kˆ¬ϕ and
¬Kˆϕ↔ K¬ϕ are EHT valid.
4 Epistemic and autoepistemic equilibrium
models
Pearce defined equilibrium models (EMs) of a formula as
classical models satisfying a minimality condition when
viewed as total HT models. Our epistemic equilibrium mod-
els (EEMs) generalise such models from classical to S5 mod-
els in a natural way. Such models however only minimise
truth, while the semantics of epistemic specifications involves
4The relation Z ⊆ T1 × T2 is serial when for every T1 ∈ T1 there
is a T2 ∈ T2 such that
(
T1,T2
)
∈ Z.
formula world views EEMs
K p → p
{
∅
} {
∅
}
¬K¬p → p
{
{p}
} {
∅
}
and
{
{p}
}
(p∨q) ∧ (¬K¬q→p)
{
{p}
} {
{p}
}
(p∨q) ∧ (K p → r)
{
{p}, {q}
} {
{p}, {q}
}
and
{
{p, r}
}
Table 3: The EHT counterparts of the epistemic specifications
of Table 2, their world views and their EEMs.
also a minimisation of knowledge. We therefore define au-
toepistemic equilibrium models (AEEMs) as EEMs that are
maximal under some order that comprises set inclusion.
4.1 Epistemic equilibrium models
We have already observed that total EHT models can be iden-
tified with classical S5 models: for T ⊆ 2P and T0 ∈ T , we
write T ,T0 |=S5 ϕ instead of
(
T , id
)
,T0 |=EHT ϕ. We define the
epistemic equilibrium models of ϕ as particular S5 models:
EEM(ϕ) =
{
T ⊆ 2P : T ,T |=S5 ϕ and there is no h , id
such that
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT ϕ
}
Table 3 illustrates our definition by means of the EHT
counterparts of the epistemic specifications of Table 2 to-
gether with their world views and EEMs. Note that not every
EEM is also a world view.
Proposition 4.1. Let ϕ be an EHT formula.
1. If ϕ is EHT valid then EEM(ϕ) =
{{
∅
}}
.
2. If
{
∅
}
|=S5 ϕ then EEM(¬¬ϕ) =
{{
∅
}}
and EEM(¬ϕ) = ∅.
If
{
∅
}
6|=S5 ϕ then EEM(¬¬ϕ) = ∅ and EEM(¬ϕ) =
{{
∅
}}
.
3. EEM(Kϕ) = EEM(ϕ).
4. If EEM(ϕ) = ∅ then EEM(Kˆϕ) = ∅.
Proposition 4.2. Let ϕ be a non-modal EHT formula. Let
EM(ϕ) be the set of (classical) equilibrium models of ϕ.
EEM(ϕ) =
{
T ⊆ EM(ϕ) : T , ∅
}
EEM(Kˆϕ) =

{
{T } : T ∈ EM(ϕ)
}
if ∅ ∈ EM(ϕ)
{
{T } : T ∈ EM(ϕ)
}
∪
{
{T, ∅} : T ∈ EM(ϕ)
}
otherwise
We illustrate the above propositions by two examples. Re-
member that EM(p∨¬p) =
{
∅, {p}
}
. It follows from Propo-
sition 4.2 that Kˆ (p∨¬p) has the EEMs
{
∅
}
and
{
{p}
}
and that
p∨¬p has one more EEM, viz.
{
∅, {p}
}
. It then follows from
Proposition 4.1.3 that the EEMs of K (p∨¬p) are
{
∅
}
,
{
{p}
}
and
{
∅, {p}
}
. Remember that ¬¬p has no EMs: the only can-
didate is ∅, but ∅ 6|= p. So ¬¬p, Kˆ¬¬p and K¬¬p have
no EEMs (cf. Proposition 4.1.2), and neither do ¬K¬p and
¬Kˆ¬p (cf. Proposition 3.5).
4.2 Autoepistemic equilibrium models
While EEMs provide an interesting epistemic generalisation
of EMs, they are somewhat too weak to provide an interest-
ing semantics of epistemic specifications. Consider the 2nd
epistemic specification ¬K¬p → p of Table 3: its EEM
{
∅
}
seems to contradict our intuitions about epistemic specifica-
tions. Roughly speaking, the interpretation of K in EEMs
should quantify over all possible answer sets. We take that
set to be
⋃
EEM(ϕ) and we are going to select the most pre-
ferred EEMs in EEM(ϕ) under set inclusion and an ordering
that is determined by the answer sets from
⋃
EEM(ϕ) that
can be taken into account.
We start by defining a nonmonotonic satisfaction relation
|=∗ for multipointed S5 models
(
T ,T0
)
involving minimisa-
tion of truth over the set of designated worlds T0:
T ,T0 |=
∗ ϕ iff T ,T0 |=S5 ϕ and
(
T , ~
)
,T0 6|=EHT ϕ
for every ~ , id that is total on T \ T0.
The first condition requires that for the total multipointed
EHT model
(
T , id
)
,T0 we have
(
T , id
)
,T0 |=EHT ϕ. The sec-
ond ‘minimality of truth’ condition, requires that there be no
EHT model
((
T , ~
)
,T0
)
of ϕ strictly weaker than
((
T , id
)
,T0
)
on T0, where by the latter we understand that ~(T ) ⊂ T for
some T ∈ T0 and ~(T ) = T for every T ∈ T \ T0. Here
are two examples (remember that the designated worlds are
underlined):
•
{
{p}, ∅
}
6|=∗ ¬K¬p→p because
{
{p}, ∅
}
6|=S5 ¬K¬p→p.
•
{
{p}, ∅
}
|=∗ ¬K¬p→p because
{
{p}, ∅
}
|=S5 ¬K¬p→p
and
{
(∅, {p}), (∅, ∅)
}
6|=EHT ¬K¬p→p.
Note that EEM(ϕ) =
{
T ⊆ 2P : T ,T |=∗ ϕ
}
.
Let ϕ be an EHT formula. We define a ϕ-indexed partial
preorder over S5 models by:
T ≤ϕ S iff for every T ∈ EEM(ϕ),
if T ∪ {T } |=∗ ϕ then S ∪ {T } |=∗ ϕ.
The strict version of ≤ϕ is defined as usual:
T <ϕ S iff T ≤ϕ S and S ϕ T .
When T <ϕ S we say that S is preferred over T for ϕ.
We are then interested in EEMs of ϕ that are maximal w.r.t.
set inclusion and w.r.t. ≤ϕ: we say that T is an autoepistemic
equilibrium model (AEEM) of ϕ if
1. T ∈ EEM(ϕ);
2. there is no S ∈ EEM(ϕ) such that T ⊂ S;
3. there is no S ∈ EEM(ϕ) such that T <ϕ S.
For example, K (p∨q) has three EEMs
{
{p}
}
,
{
{q}
}
and{
{p}, {q}
}
. While they are incomparable under ≤ϕ, the latter
is the only AEEM because it is set-inclusion maximal. Con-
sider again Π∗ = ¬K¬p → p of Table 3. For its two EEMs{
∅
}
and
{
{p}
}
we have
{
∅
}
<Π∗
{
{p}
}
. This is the case because{
∅, {p}
}
|=∗ Π∗ while
{
∅, {p}
}
6|=∗ Π∗. So
{
{p}
}
is the only
AEEM of Π∗, matching Kahl’s semantics.
When ϕ has an EEM then ϕ also has an AEEM. It follows
from Proposition 4.2 that a nonmodal formula ϕ has at most
AEEM: the set of all EMs of ϕ.
Proposition 4.3. If EEM(ϕ) = ∅ then ϕ has no AEEM. If
EEM(ϕ) is a singleton then then the AEEMs of ϕ equal the
EEMs of ϕ.
epistemic specif. Π world views EEMs of Π∗
p or q ←
{
{p}, {q}
} {
{p}
}
⊂
{
{p}, {q}
}
{
{q}
}
⊂
{
{p}, {q}
}
p or q ←
{
{p}
} {
{p}
}
p ← notK not q
p or q ←
{
{p}, {q}
} {
{p}
}
⊂
{
{p}, {q}
}
p ← K q
p or q ←
{
{p}
} {
{q}
}
<Π∗
{
{p}
}
p ← notK q
p or q ←
{
{p}, {q}
} {
{p, r}
}
<Π∗
{
{p}, {q}
}
r ← K p
p or q ←
{
{p, r}, {q, r}
} {
{p, r}
}
⊂
{
{p, r}, {q, r}
}
r ← notK not p
{
{q}
}
<Π∗
{
{p, r}, {q, r}
}
p ← K p
{
∅
} {
∅
}
p ← notK not p
{
{p}
} {
∅
}
<Π∗
{
{p}
}
p ← K p none none
p ← notK p
p ← notK q
{
{p}
}
and
{
{q}
} {
{p}
}
and
{
{q}
}
q ← notK p (incomparable)
p ← notK not p
{
{p}
} {
{p}
}
p ← K not p
p ← q
{
{p, q}
} {
∅
}
<Π∗
{
{p, q}
}
q ← notK not p
p ← notK not q
{
{p, q}
} {
∅
}
<Π∗
{
{p, q}
}
q ← notK not p
p ← notK not q, not q
{
∅
}
and
{
{p}, {q}
} {
∅
}
<Π∗
{
{p}, {q}
}
q ← notK not p, not p
Table 4: Examples of Kahl’s world views and our AEEMs,
which are the maximal EEMs under ⊂ or ≤Π∗ .
5 AEEMs for epistemic specifications
We now compare AEEMs with existing semantics for epis-
temic specifications. But first we translate epistemic specifi-
cations into EHT formulas.
5.1 Embedding epistemic specifications
Let Π be an epistemic specification. Our translation (.)∗ re-
places ‘←’, ‘ or ’, ‘,’ and ‘not ’ respectively by ‘→’, ‘∨’,
‘∧’ and ‘¬’. Furthermore, it introduces a fresh variable p˜ for
each ∼p occurring in Π. For these new variables, the formula
Cons(Π) =
∧
p∈PΠ
¬(p∧p˜) ensures that p and p˜ cannot be
true at the same time. (We only need it for those p that are
prefixed by a strong negation in Π.) Here is an example:
Π = p or∼q ← r, not s
Π∗ =
(
(r∧¬s) → (p∨q˜)
)
∧ ¬(q∧q˜)
5.2 Comparison with Kahl’s semantics
We now compare Kahl’s world views of an epistemic speci-
fication Π with our AEEMs of Π∗. We do so by means of a
series of examples most of which stem from [Kahl, 2014].
Table 4 lists epistemic specifications together with their
(ordered) EEMs. The only example where the two semantics
differ is the last one. The intuitions of quantification about
answer sets seem to argue in favour of our semantics here.
Let us terminate with the AEEMs of Gelfond’s ‘eligibility’
specification ΠG of Section 2.1. The formula Π
∗
G
has three
EEMs: T1 =
{
{h, e, i}, { f , i}
}
, T2 =
{
{h, e}
}
and T3 =
{
{ f , i}
}
of
which only T1 is intended. It can be checked that T3 ⊂ T1
and T2 <Π∗
G
T1.
5.3 Comparison with older approaches
We here discuss some older approaches that tried to gener-
alise or to refine epistemic specifications and then compare
our approach to an epistemic extension of equilibrium logic
that is due to Wang and Zhang [2005] and that is close in spirit
to our approach. All the approaches that we discuss here deal
with the former version of epistemic specifications of [Gel-
fond, 1991; 1994; Baral and Gelfond, 1994], which behaves
differently from the more recent versions in [Gelfond, 2011;
Kahl, 2014].
As far as we know, the first embedding of epistemic speci-
fications into an epistemic modal logic with a kind of minimal
model reasoning about epistemic concepts knowledge and be-
lief was Chen’s [1997]. His approach significantly differs
from ours because our approach is in terms of an intuition-
istic modal logic with non-dual epistemic operators. More
recently, Truszczyn´ski [2011] proposed a refinement of epis-
temic specifications. His approach allows for the model
{
∅
}
of the formula (p∨¬p) → p, which departs from all other
approaches (in particular it has no EMs).
Wang and Zhang (WZ) [2005] described an epistemic ex-
tension of equilibrium logic into which they were able to em-
bed Gelfond’s first version of epistemic specifications. This
extension also gives semantics to nested epistemic logic pro-
grams. The language extends that of HT by two modal oper-
ators K and M. Let us call WZ-EHT models their epistemic
HT models. A WZ-EHT model is a triple (A,H,T ) where
A ⊆ 2P is a collection of valuations and (H,T ) is an HT
model. Note that H and T are not necessarily contained in
A. Given A, define the collection
coll(A) = {(H,T ) : H,T ∈ A such that H ⊆ T }.
Then the definition of the satisfaction relation can be recast in
terms of our semantics as follows:
A,H,T |=EHT p if p ∈ H;
A,H,T |=EHT Kϕ if coll(A), A |=EHT ϕ for all A ∈ coll(A);
A,H,T |=EHT Mϕ if coll(A), A |=EHT ϕ for some A ∈ coll(A).
Then WZ-EEMs for a theory Φ are total WZ-EHT models
(A,T,T ) of Φ such that there is no EHT model (A,H,T ) of
Φ with H ⊂ T . Finally, Wang and Zhang define equilibrium
views of Φ to be the maximal collections A ⊂ 2P satisfying
the fixed-point equation
A = {T : (A,T,T ) is a WZ-EEM of Φ}.
While both we and Wang and Zhang propose an epistemic
extension of equilibrium logic, there are some fundamental
differences. Let us summarise the relationship. First, each
satisfiable EHT formula has also a WZ-EHT model; the other
way round, for instance K p∧¬p has a WZ-EHT model but
no EHT model. Second, the concept of minimality of knowl-
edge differs: both K p∧¬p and K¬¬p have WZ-EEMs but
no EEMs in our sense; the other way round, K p∧¬¬p has
an EEM in our sense, but no WZ-EEM. Third, maximisa-
tion of ignorance is not performed in the same way: K p has
an AEEM, but no WZ-equilibrium view. The formulas Kˆ p,
Kˆ p∧¬p, (p∨q)∧(Kˆ q → p) and p∨K (p∨¬p) are other exam-
ples; (Kˆ¬p∨Kˆ¬¬p)∧(Kˆ p → (p∨¬p)) has a WZ-equilibrium
view, but no AEEM.
6 Strong equivalence
We now show that strong equivalence both in the EEM sense
and in the AEEM sense can be captured in EHT. Precisely,
we show that EHT validity of the equivalence
K
(∧
Φ1
)
↔ K
(∧
Φ2
)
characterises that
1. for every Θ, Φ1 ∪ Θ and Φ2 ∪ Θ have the same EEMs;
2. for every Θ, Φ1 ∪Θ and Φ2 ∪Θ have the same AEEMs.
Our proofs are non-trivial generalisations of Lifschitz et
al.’s [2001] proof for HT logic. They require the syntactical
characterisation of EHT models. To that end, using Propo-
sition 3.4, we may suppose without loss of generality that P
is finite. This allows to describe possible worlds and EHT
models by means of formulas.
6.1 Some characteristic formulas
Let us define the following:
Total = K
∧
p∈P
(p ∨ ¬p)
At(T ) =
(∧
p∈T
p
)
∧
(∧
p<T
¬p
)
Ch(~) = K
∧
T∈T
(
¬¬At(T ) →
(( ∧
p∈~(T )
p
)
∧
∧
p∈(T\~(T ))
(p → Total)
))
where T ∈ 2P and
(
T , ~
)
is an EHT model. The formula Total
captures that the model is total. At(T ) says that we are at a
there-world (and not at a here-world). Given an S5 model T ,
Ch(~) characterises ~: it says that the here-function is either
~ or id.
Lemma 6.1. Let
((
T , ~
)
,T0
)
be a multipointed EHT model
and let T0,T ∈ T . Then:
1.
(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT Total iff ~ = id.
2.
(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT At(T ) iff T0 = T = ~(T0).
3.
(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT ¬¬At(T ) iff T0 = T.
4.
(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT Ch(h) and T ,T0 |=S5 Ch(h).
5. If
(
T , ~′
)
,T0 |=EHT Ch(h) then ~
′ = id or ~′ = ~.
Proof. We only prove the last item.
Let
(
T , ~′
)
,T0 |=EHT Ch(h). We use that by Lemma 6.1.3,(
T , ~′
)
,T |=EHT ¬¬At(T ). Suppose ~
′
, ~. Then there are
T ∈ T and p ∈ T such that either p ∈ ~(T ) and p < ~′(T ), or
p < ~(T ) and p ∈ ~′(T ). In the former case, the hypothesis(
T , ~′
)
,T0 |=EHT Ch(h) implies that
(
T , ~′
)
,T0 |=EHT p, i.e., a
contradiction. In the latter case, as p < ~(T ) and p ∈ T it
implies that
(
T , ~′
)
,T |=EHT Total; then by Lemma 6.1.1 we
must have ~′ = id. 
6.2 Strong equivalence for EEMs
Lemma 6.2. Let
((
T , ~
)
,T0
)
be a multipointed EHT model
such that ~ is total on T \ T0. Then
(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT Φ1 and(
T , ~
)
,T0 6|=EHT Φ2 implies that there is a theory Θ such that
(a) T ,T0 6|=
∗ Φ1 ∪ Θ and T ,T0 |=
∗ Φ2 ∪ Θ, or
(b) T ,T0 |=
∗ Φ1 ∪ Θ and T ,T0 6|=
∗ Φ2 ∪ Θ.
Proof. We build two different Θ, depending on whether
T ,T0 |=S5 Φ2 or not.
When T ,T0 6|=S5 Φ2 then we define Θ = {Total} and prove
that T ,T0 |=
∗ Φ1 ∪ Θ and T ,T0 6|=
∗ Φ2 ∪ Θ. The lat-
ter immediately follows from the hypothesis that T ,T0 6|=S5
Φ2. As to the former, T ,T0 |=S5 Φ1 ∪ Θ is the case be-
cause T ,T0 |=S5 Φ1 by hypothesis and heredity and because
T ,T0 |=S5 Total by Lemma 6.1; moreover, for every ~
′
, id
we have
(
T , ~′
)
,T0 6|=EHT Total, again by Lemma 6.1.
When T ,T0 |=S5 Φ2 then we define Θ = {Ch(~)} and prove
that T ,T0 6|=
∗ Φ1∪Θ and T ,T0 |=
∗ Φ2∪Θ. The former holds
because we are in a situation where
(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT Φ1 ∪ Θ
for a function ~ that is total on T \ T0 and that is different
from id (because T ,T0 |=S5 Φ2 and
(
T , ~
)
,T0 6|=EHT Φ2). As
to the latter: first, we have T ,T0 |=S5 Φ2 by hypothesis and
T ,T0 |=S5 Ch(~) by Lemma 6.1; second, consider some ~
′
,
id that is total on T \ T0. On the one hand, when ~
′ = ~ then
by hypothesis
(
T , ~′
)
,T0 6|=EHT Φ2; on the other hand, when
~′ , ~ then
(
T , ~′
)
,T0 6|=EHT Ch(~) by Lemma 6.1. In both
cases,
(
T , ~′
)
,T0 6|=EHT Φ2 ∪ {Ch(~)}. 
Theorem 6.1. Let Φ1 and Φ2 be two EHT theories. The fol-
lowing are equivalent:
1. For every Θ, Φ1 ∪ Θ and Φ2 ∪ Θ have the same EEMs;
2. K
(∧
Φ1
)
↔ K
(∧
Φ2
)
is EHT valid.
Proof. For the right-to-left direction, suppose K
(∧
Φ1
)
↔
K
(∧
Φ2
)
is EHT valid, i.e., no EHT model allows to distin-
guish K
(∧
Φ1
)
and K
(∧
Φ2
)
. Then
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT Φ1 iff(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT Φ2 by Proposition 3.1. Therefore for every
theory Θ,
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT Φ1 ∪ Θ iff
(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT Φ2 ∪ Θ. It
follows that EEM(Φ1 ∪ Θ) = EEM(Φ2 ∪ Θ).
For the left-to-right direction, suppose the equivalence
K
(∧
Φ1
)
↔ K
(∧
Φ2
)
is EHT invalid. Suppose w.l.o.g. that(
T , ~
)
,T0 |=EHT K
(∧
Φ1
)
and
(
T , ~
)
,T0 6|=EHT K
(∧
Φ2
)
. Then(
T , ~
)
,T |=EHT Φ1 and
(
T , ~
)
,T 6|=EHT Φ2 by Proposition 3.1.
By Lemma 6.2 (which is applicable because ~ is trivially total
on T \T = ∅), we have that there must exist a Θ such that ei-
ther T ,T 6|=∗ Φ1∪Θ and T ,T |=
∗ Φ2∪Θ, or T ,T |=
∗ Φ1∪Θ
and T ,T 6|=∗ Φ2 ∪Θ. So EEM(Φ1 ∪Θ) , EEM(Φ2 ∪Θ). 
6.3 Strong equivalence for AEEMs
We define a further formula characterising the set of all there-
worlds of a EHT model
(
T , ~
)
by means of Jankov-Fine-like
formulas [Blackburn et al., 2001]:
JF(T ) =
( ∧
T∈T
Kˆ¬¬At(T )
)
∧ K
( ∨
T∈T
¬¬At(T )
)
.
Lemma 6.3. Let
(
S, ~
)
be an EHT model. Then
(
S, ~
)
,S0 |=EHT JF(T ) iff S = T .
Theorem 6.2. Let Φ1 and Φ2 be two EHT theories. The fol-
lowing are equivalent:
1. For every Θ, Φ1 ∪Θ and Φ2 ∪Θ have the same AEEMs;
2. K
(∧
Φ1
)
↔ K
(∧
Φ2
)
is EHT valid.
Proof. The proof of the right-to-left direction follows the
lines of that of Theorem 6.1.
The proof of the left-to-right direction also follows the
lines of that of Theorem 6.1, it is only the construction of the
set Θ of Lemma 6.2 that has to be adapted: the Jankov-Fine
formula JF(T ) has to be conjoined with theΘs in the proof of
Lemma 6.2. Lemma 6.3 guarantees that there is exactly one
EEM of Φ2 ∪ Θ (resp. Φ1 ∪ Θ). It then follows from Proposi-
tion 4.3 that there also is exactly one AEEM of Φ2 ∪ Θ (resp.
Φ1 ∪ Θ). 
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have designed a monotonic, simple and neat
intuitionistic modal logic EHT: the two modal operators K
and Kˆ that we add to the original language of HT are inter-
preted in models that are straightforward combinations of the
Kripke models for S5 and HT. Based on this logic, we have
first defined epistemic equilibrium models (EEMs) by means
of a truth-minimising criterion, and then autoepistemic equi-
librium models (AEEMs) by maximising ignorance. The lat-
ter models are powerful enough to provide a new logical se-
mantics not only for epistemic specifications, but also for pro-
grams with arbitrary nestings of K and →. We have provided
a strong equivalence characterisation and have compared our
semantics with the existing semantics for epistemic specifica-
tions.
We believe that EHT and the epistemic and autoepistemic
equilibrium logics that we have built on it provide a good
starting point for further extensions of answer-set programs
by modal concepts. A first step could be the extension from
single-agent epistemic logic to multi-agent epistemic logic.
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